Shockingly enough, the climate fearmonger Gavin Schmidt of RealClimate.ORG wrote something that I agree with:
Schmidt's main point that I agree with is that these analogies are pretty much worthless for the debate about the substance because these analogies are only relevant for someone who already accepts the basic points about the substance. If one already knows (or at least assumes) that the climate panic is hogwash, he will know that the skeptics' favorite analogies are approximately right while the alarmists' analogies are misleading. If she still believes that the climate is dangerously changing, she will refuse the skeptics' favorite analogies and buy the alarmists' ones.
None of these analogies can really settle the starting point, namely the substance of the climate panic or the non-existence of it. All people who are rational know that. (The previous proposition isn't supported by empirical data but it is backed by a logical argument.) If we compare a group of people to some generally accepted big winners (or losers) of the history of science, we are making an assumption that we haven't proven by this analogy itself. And the analogy is only as relevant as its assumptions are valid.
In the previous paragraph, I mentioned "people who are rational". It's because many people are not rational and if they hear someone comparing a group (e.g. climate skeptics) to someone who is a loser, they automatically deduce that the group (e.g. climate skeptics) is wrong and bad even though they have actually been given no evidence whatever.
The analogies and other demagogic arguments may have a great impact on the reasoning and beliefs of such gullible people.
It is not hard to see that most of the devoted believers in the climate change orthodoxy belong among these gullible brainwashed impressionable morons. The previous sentence isn't an analogy; it is a sociological comment about this particular situation. You may check that it's probably right when you open the comments under Schmidt's article. Most of the commenters disagree with Schmidt. They think it's important to compare climate skeptics with unpopular groups. No doubt about it, these critics love to elaborate upon such analogies.
While I agree with Schmidt about his main points that these sociological analogies have nothing to say about the substance, I disagree with many other things he believes or writes. Of course, I disagree with the substance of his climate hysteria. But I disagree with some of Schmidt's other sociological claims, too. For example, he insanely believes in the "consensus science":
Given the rarity of a consensus-overturning event, the only sensible prior is to assume that [the majority of gullible sheep and multiply counted would-be experts living in a deep and mindless group think is always right].But this logical implication is completely wrong. Consensus-overturning events may be "rare" if we use a certain measure, but that doesn't imply that the majority is right about controversial questions.
In fact, every discovery in science is a consensus-overturning event and almost all of progress in science is composed of these events. So while they may be "rare" in the sense of "percentage of the time" that they occupy on the timeline, they represent almost 100% of the events that the history of science is composed of. To discover something means to find something that others don't know or believe to be non-existent (or to prove the non-existence of something that is believed to exist, like the luminiferous aether). The more important the discovery is, the more likely it is for a significant opposition to emerge. The more important the discovery is, the more visibly it overturns the existing knowledge (or it changes the opinions about more important questions).
Otherwise, Schmidt realizes and acknowledges that analogies between two situations are helpful and independent of the assumptions about the scientific substance if they show that a particular method or logic would lead (or would have led or actually has led) to completely wrong or undesirable outcomes in other situations. For example, we may see that the political intimidation of scientists would have distorted lots of other scientific research as well and many discoveries could have become impossible, or impossible to spread.
The undesirability of the non-experts' political intervention into the scientific research isn't an analogy. It is a general principle that may be seen theoretically as well as by looking at many examples from the history of science. Of course that the intervening political forces may sometimes happen to be right, too. That's why the existence of such undesirable influences doesn't prove and doesn't disprove the climate change psychopathy.